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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Phillip James Morgan appeals from his judgment and sentence entered
upon his conviction for felony driving under the influence.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
Phillip James Morgan was charged with felony DUI for driving his vehicle
while under the influence of alcohol. (R., pp. 19-20.) Prior to trial, Morgan filed a
motion to suppress, asserting that his stop was not supported by reasonable
suspicion that he had violated a traffic law. (R., pp. 27-32.) He also asserted
that law enforcement lacked probable cause to arrest him and violated his
Miranda rights. (R., pp. 33-35.) The state filed a response (R., pp. 40-41) and

the motion was set for a hearing (R., pp. 42-43).
At the hearing, Sean Stace, a patrol officer with the Boise Police
Department, testified. He testified that he was working "bar patrol" on March 12,
2010. (Tr., p. 9, L. 17 - p. 10, L.7. 1) At approximately 9:20 p.m., he witnessed
an individual driving a vehicle without a front license plate. (Tr., p. 10, Ls. 8 14.) He turned around and followed the car to determine if it had a rear Idaho
license plate. (Tr., p. 10, Ls. 14-17.) As he followed the vehicle, it made a series
of left turns, ultimately driving around the block and returning to the location
where Officer Stace had first viewed the vehicle. (Tr., p. 12, L. 1 - p. 13, L. 18.)
After driving around the block, the vehicle stopped on the roadway. (Tr., p. 13,

I Unless otherwise noted, citations to "Tr." are to the transcript of the 6/15/10
hearing on Morgan's motion to suppress.
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Ls. 16-25.) Officer Stace explained that "the vehicle pulled over and just slightly
from where it was traveling normally within the lane, pulled over just a little bit
and came to a stop." (Tr., p. 14, Ls. 10-13.) He continued, "for me to pass the
vehicle, I would have had to drive in that portion of the road that is normally
traveled by vehicles coming in the opposite direction.

There was no traffic

coming at that moment, but I did have to brake to avoid running into this person."
(Tr., p. 14, Ls. 14-19.) He testified that after the vehicle came to it stop and it
was clear to him that it was not going to continue driving, he turned on his
overhead lights and contacted the driver. (Tr., p. 14, L. 23 - p. 15, L. 4.) He
testified that the car was stopped in violation of Idaho code - blocking a roadway.
(Tr., p. 14, Ls. 20-22.)
On cross examination he admitted the vehicle had an out-of-state rear
license plate and that he did not have a reason to stop the vehicle for a license
plate violation. (Tr., p. 25, Ls. 1-8.) After reviewing several Idaho statutes, he
explained that he thought the vehicle had violated I.C. § 49-659, which prohibits
stopping, standing or parking outside business or residential districts. (Tr., p. 25,
L. 9 - p. 27, L. 1.)

After the hearing, the district court made the following findings of fact and
conclusions of law:
1.
In the evening hours of March 12,2010, Boise Police
Officer Stace, who has had more than ten years experience as a
law enforcement officer in California and New York, saw an SUV
being driven by Defendant Philip Morgan on Taft Street in Boise.
The SUV displayed no front license plate in apparent violation of
I.C. Section 49-428. It later developed that the SUV was registered
in Arkansas where no front license plate is provided.
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2.
Officer Stace followed the SUV as it circled the block.
The direction of travel taken by the SUV lead [sic] Officer Stace to
believe that the driver was attempting to avoid him, but he observed
no violations of the rules of the road in the driving pattern. The
SUV came to a complete stop back on Taft St. for no apparent
reason, partially blocking one of the travelled lanes of the relatively
narrow two-way street. Officer Stace believed, perhaps incorrectly,
that the stop in the travelled roadway was a violation of I.C. Section
49-659. These observations, coupled with a suspicion that the
driver of the SUV was trying to avoid him, lead [sic] Officer Stace to
the conclusion that he should investigate further.
3.
He stopped his police car behind the SUV, turned on
the overhead lights, and approached the SUV.

10.

Mr. Morgan has moved to suppress.

11.
Mr. Morgan contends first that the stop was not
supported by reasonable suspicion. The initial stop on Taft Street
was Mr. Morgan's voluntary act and did not amount to an
investigatory stop. Compare, State v. Jordan, 122 Idaho 771, 839
P.2d 38 (Ct. App. 1992). Officer Stace's subsequent act of turning
on his overhead lights, however, was a clear indication that Mr.
Morgan was not free to drive off. Thus a stop and detention was
implicated in this case.
12.
The stop and detention must comport with
constitutional standards of reasonableness.
An automobile
investigatory stop and detention is justified under the Fourth
amendment if the officer has a reasonable suspicion, based on
specific articulable facts, together with the rational inferences
therefrom, that warrant suspicion that the person stopped has been
or is about to commit a crime. State v. Benefiel, 131 Idaho 226,
953 P.2d 976 (1998) and cases cited therein. Furthermore, "A
person temporarily detained pursuant to an ordinary traffic stop is
not in custody for purposes of Miranda." State v. Benefiel, 131
Idaho at 229.
13.
It goes without saying that Officer Stace's suspicion
that Mr. Morgan was avoiding him was not the type of suspicion
sufficient to permit an investigatory stop and detention.
Nevertheless, at the time of the initiation of the temporary stop and
detention, that is, when the overhead lights went on subsequently
to Mr. Morgan's voluntary stop, Officer State also had a reasonable
articulable suspicion that the defendant had violated I.C. Sections
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49-428 and 49-659. These reasonable suspicions justified the
initial investigatory detention. They were more than mere hunches.
That it later was determined that in fact those statutes may not
have been violated is irrelevant.
(R., pp. 51-53.) The district court denied Morgan's motion to suppress. (R., p.
55.) At trial, a jury found Morgan guilty of felony driving under the influence. (R.,
p. 89.)

Morgan was sentenced to eight years with two years fixed, and the

district court retained jurisdiction.

(R., pp. 128-30.)

(R., pp. 136-38.)
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Morgan timely appealed.

ISSUE
Morgan states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Morgan's motion to
suppress as there existed no objectively reasonable, articulable
suspicion that his vehicle was being operated in violation of the law;
thus, Mr. Morgan's Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable seizures was violated?
(Appellant's brief, p. 5.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Morgan failed to show error in the district court's denial of his motion
to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
Morgan Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Denial Of His Motion To
Suppress
A.

Introduction
Morgan challenges the denial of his motion to suppress, arguing that the

district court erred as a matter of law in concluding Officer Stace had reasonable
suspicion to believe that Morgan had violated either I.C. § 49-428 - failure to
display front license plate - or I.C. § 49-659 - parking, stopping or standing
outside business or residential districts.

(Appellant's brief, p. 6.)

The state

acknowledges that the evidence does not support the district court's conclusion
that Officer Stace possessed reasonable suspicion that Morgan was operating
his vehicle in violation of either of these laws. Morgan has nevertheless failed to
show any basis for reversal because application of the correct legal standards to
the facts of this case shows the stop was supported by objectively reasonable
suspicion that Morgan had violated a Boise City Ordinance that prohibits
stopping, standing or parking in specified places, and had otherwise engaged in
criminal activity. The district court's order denying Morgan's motion to suppress
should be affirmed on these alternative bases.

See,~,

McKinney v. State, 133

Idaho 695,700,992 P.2d 144, 149 (1999); State v. Avelar, 129 Idaho 700,704,
931 P.2d 1218, 1222 (1997) (where the lower court reaches the correct result by
a different theory, the appellate court will affirm the order on the correct theory).
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B.

Standard Of Review
'''[D]eterminations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause should be

reviewed de novo on appeal.'" State v. Munoz, 149 Idaho 121, _,233 P.3d 52,
58 (2010) (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996)) (brackets
original). "[I]n conducting that review the appellate court 'should take care both
to review findings of historical fact only for clear error and to give due weight to
inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement
officers.'"

~

The power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual

conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court.
State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v.
Fleenor, 133 Idaho 552,555,989 P.2d 784, 787 (Ct. App. 1999). The appellate
court also gives deference to any implicit findings of the trial court supported by
substantial evidence. State v. Brauch, 133 Idaho 215, 218, 984 P.2d 703, 706
(1999).

C.

Officer Stace Had Objective Reasonable Suspicion To Stop Morgan
The temporary detention of individuals during the stop of an automobile by

the police constitutes a "seizure" of "persons" within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.

Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10 (1996).

An

automobile stop is thus subject to the constitutional imperative that it not be
"unreasonable" under the circumstances.

~

at 810. Traffic stops do not offend

the Fourth Amendment when "they are based upon reasonable, articulable
suspicion that the vehicle is being driven contrary to traffic laws or that the
vehicle or an occupant has been or is about to be involved in criminal activity."
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State v. McCarthy, 133 Idaho 119, 124, 982 P.2d 954, 959 (Ct. App. 1999); see
also Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968)).
"The reasonable suspicion standard requires less than probable cause,
but more than mere speculation or instinct on the part of the officer." State v.
Flowers, 131 Idaho 205, 209, 953 P.2d 645, 649 (Ct. App. 1998). Reasonable
suspicion, like probable cause, is determined with reference to the facts and
circumstances within the officer's knowledge at the time of the investigative stop
or arrest.

Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004) (citing Maryland v.

Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003)); see also State v. Gallegos, 120 Idaho 894,
897, 821 P.2d 949, 952 (1991) ("[T]he proper inquiry is to look at the totality of
the circumstances and ask whether the facts available to the officers at the time
of the stop gave rise to a reasonable suspicion, not probable cause to believe,
that criminal activity may be afoot.").
Evenhanded law enforcement is best achieved by the application of
objective standards of conduct, rather than standards that depend on the
subjective beliefs of the police officer. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 138
(1990). Search and seizure activity that is objectively reasonable is not made
unreasonable merely because of the arresting officer's mistaken subjective
belief. Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470-71 (1985).

8

1.

The State Concedes That Officer Stace Did Not Possess
Reasonable Articulable Suspicion That Morgan Had Violated I.C. §
49-428, Display Of Plate And Stickers, Or I.C. § 49-659, Stopping,
Standing Or Parking Outside Business Or Residential Districts

The district court found Officer Stace had reasonable, articulable suspicion
that Morgan violated I.C. § 49-428, which requires a vehicle registered in Idaho
to have a license plate attached on both the front and rear of the vehicle. See
I.C. § 49-428.

Officer Stace testified that he initially began following Morgan

because he witnessed Morgan driving without a front plate and wanted to know if
his rear plate was an Idaho plate. (Tr., p. 11, L. 20 - p. 12, L. 3.) He further
testified that after Morgan stopped his vehicle but before he initiated the stop, he
realized that Morgan's rear plate was not an Idaho plate and that there was no
reason to stop Morgan for a license plate violation. (Tr., p. 24, L. 3 - p. 25, L. 8.)
Based on this evidence, the state concedes that Officer Stace did not have
reasonable, articulable suspicion at the time he initiated the stop to believe that
Morgan had violated I.C. § 49-428. The district court erred in holding this as a
basis for the stop.
The district court also found that Officer Stace had reasonable articulable
suspicion that Morgan violated I.C. § 49-659, which reads:
Outside a business or residential district no person shall stop, park
or leave standing any vehicle, whether attended or unattended,
upon the roadway when it is practicable to stop, park, or so leave
the vehicle off the roadway, but in every event in an unobstructed
width of the highway opposite a standing vehicle shall be left for the
free passage of other vehicles and a clear view of the stopped
vehicle shall be available from a distance of two hundred (200) feet
in each direction upon the highway.
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Officer Stace testified that Morgan moved his vehicle "right on the
roadway a little bit" when he stopped. (Tr., p. 24, Ls. 8-9.) He further testified
that to pass the vehicle he would "have had to drive in the portion of the road that
is normally traveled by vehicle coming in the opposite direction." (Tr., p. 14, Ls.
14-19.) Officer Stace also testified that he did not know if there was an irrigation
ditch on the side of the road but noted that it was not "a fair shoulder to pull onto."
(Tr., p. 24, Ls. 10-13.)

Photographs of the area show that the street where

Morgan stopped is narrow and has very little shoulder to park on. (Def. Exhibits
A, B.) They also show that the street is straight in the location where Morgan
stopped and Morgan's vehicle would have been visible for some distance in
either direction. (ld.) It was also not disputed that Officer Stace was a Boise
police officer and that the parties were discussing streets located in the City of
Boise. (Tr., p. 6, L. 25-p. 7, L. 2; p. 10, L. 11-p. 13, L. 18.)
Based on this evidence, Officer Stace did not have reasonable, articulable
suspicion to believe that Morgan stopped his vehicle in contravention of I.C. § 49659. The stop occurred within the City of Boise and not "outside a business or
residential district," Morgan moved his vehicle to the right of the road, he left an
"unobstructed width of the highway ... for the free passage of other vehicles,"
and a "clear view of the stopped vehicle" was available for some distance. Given
this evidence, the district court erred in holding a violation of I.C. § 49-659 as a
basis for the stop.
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2.

The Traffic Stop Was Justified Based On Morgan's Violation Of
Boise City Ordinance 10-11-04

"Probable cause and reasonable suspicion are objective tests.

Neither

test depends on the individual officer's subjective thoughts nor upon the bases
previously offered by the state to justify the stop." State v. Young, 144 Idaho
646, 648, 167 P.3d 783, 785 (2007) (citing Deen v. State, 131 Idaho 435, 436,
958 P.2d 592, 593 (1998) (reasonable suspicion); State v. Murphy, 129 Idaho
861, 863-64, 934 P.2d 34, 36-37 (Ct. App. 1997) (probable cause)).

"[I]n

determining whether a traffic stop constituted a lawful seizure, courts freely apply
relevant law to the objective facts presented, unconstrained by law enforcement's
reasoning."

~

This prevents costly resort to the exclusionary rule where a

police officer or prosecutor merely fails to articulate the appropriate justification
for an otherwise legal search.

~

Probable cause existed to detain Morgan based on Morgan's violation of
Boise City Ordinance 10-11-04, Stopping, Standing Or Parking Prohibited In
Specified Places.

This ordinance, which is attached as Appendix A, reads in

relevant part:
Except when necessary to avoid conflict with other traffic, or
in compliance with law or the directions of a police officer or official
traffic control device, no person shall:

D.
Park a vehicle as defined by Section 10-1-1 in or
upon a street during the nighttime, except that this prohibition does
not apply in a business or restricted parking district and the owners
or occupants of property adjacent to the street may so park a
vehicle in compliance with and as authorized by any other provision
of the Idaho City Code ....
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"Parking" is defined in Section 10-01-01:

"The words 'Park or Parking' shall

mean the standing of a vehicle, whether occupied or not, other than temporarily
for the purpose of and while actively engaged in loading or unloading goods,
merchandise or persons."
The evidence adduced at Morgan's suppression hearing established that
Morgan parked his vehicle "right on the roadway a little bit." (Tr., p. 24, Ls. 8-9.)
The evidence also showed that the stop occurred around 9:20 p.m. on March 12,
2010, and that it was dark in the area. (Tr., p. 10, Ls. 8-17; p. 12, Ls. 1-4.) In the
City of Boise, a person may not park a vehicle "upon a street during the
nighttime." Boise City Ordinance 10-11-04. Because Morgan parked his vehicle
"upon a street during the nighttime," he violated this ordinance. This provided a
basis for the stop.
Morgan's stop on the street at nighttime justified the detention in this case.
This is true even though the officer did not specifically articulate the ordinance as
the law he though Morgan violated by stopping on the roadway. "Reasonable
and articulable suspicion is an objective test and depends neither upon the
individual officer's subjective thoughts nor upon the bases previously offered by
the State to justify the stop."

Deen, 131 Idaho at 436, 958 P.2d at 593.

Accordingly, Morgan has failed to show that the district court erred in denying his
motion to suppress.
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3.

Officer Stace Possessed Reasonable Articulable Suspicion That
Criminal Activity Was Afoot In Which Morgan Was Involved

A traffic stop by an officer constitutes a seizure of the vehicle's occupants
and implicates the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979); State v.
Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559,561,916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). A traffic
stop is constitutionally justified, however, if the officer possesses a reasonable
suspicion, based upon articulable facts, that the person driving the vehicle has
committed or is about to commit a crime. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,
417 (1981); State v. Bromgard, 139 Idaho 375,378-79,79 P.3d 734, 737-38 (Ct.
App. 2003). "The United States Supreme Court has held that reasonable
suspicion for an investigatory detention can arise from information that is less
reliable than that required to show probable cause." Bromgard, 139 Idaho at 379,
79 P.3d at 738 (citing Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 300 (1990)). The
reasonableness of the officer's suspicion must be evaluated in light of the totality
of the circumstances at the time of the stop. State v. Rawlings, 121 Idaho 930,
932, 829 P.2d 520, 522 (1992) (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411
(1981)); State v. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474, 483, 988 P.2d 700, 709 (Ct. App.
1999).
The totality of the facts known to Officer Stace at the time of the stop
supplied him with reasonable suspicion to believe that Morgan was involved in
criminal activity.

As discussed above, Officer Stace first observed Morgan

driving without a front license plate. He turned around to follow him. Morgan
made a series of turns, ultimately returning to where Officer Stace first observed
13

him driving, and then slightly pulled his SUV to the side of the road and stopped.
There were no homes on the street. (See Exhibit.) It was reasonable for Officer
Stace to suspect, based on Morgan's driving pattern and subsequent stop in the
street, that that Morgan was attempting to conceal his actions from him.
Morgan's driving pattern and attempted evasion is significant. In Illinois v.
Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 121 (2000), the United States Supreme Court held that
evasive behavior can be a basis for reasonable suspicion.

In Wardlow, the

defendant fled upon seeing police officers patrolling an area known for heavy
narcotics trafficking. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 121. When Wardlow was stopped
and frisked, the officers found a gun.

kl at

122. In holding that the officers had

reasonable suspicion, the Court stated that evasive behavior is a pertinent factor
to be considered in the totality of the circumstances analysis. 1Q. at 124. The
Supreme Court explained:
In this case, moreover, it was not merely respondent's
presence in an area of heavy narcotics trafficking that aroused the
officers' suspicion, but his unprovoked flight upon noticing the
police. Our cases have also recognized that nervous, evasive
behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion.
[Citations omitted.] Headlong flight - wherever it occurs - is the
consummate act of evasion: It is not necessarily indicative of
wrongdoing, but it is certainly suggestive of such. In reviewing the
propriety of an officer's conduct, courts do not have available
empirical studies dealing with inferences drawn from suspicious
behavior, and we cannot reasonably demand scientific certainty
from judges or law enforcement officers where none exists. Thus,
the determination of reasonable suspicion must be based on
commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior.
[Citation omitted.] We conclude Officer Nolan was justified in
suspecting that Wardlow was involved in criminal activity, and
therefore, in investigating further.
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Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124-125 (emphasis added).

See also, United States v.

Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002) (defendant's sudden and marked deceleration upon
seeing a law enforcement vehicle, together with other factors, supplied a
particularized and objective basis for traffic stop). Attempts to avoid police, then,
are a pertinent factor in deciding whether an officer has reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity.
It is well settled that reasonable suspicion may exist even if each of the
officer's observations alone is susceptible of innocent explanation.

See,~,

Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273-276; State v. Grantham, 146 Idaho 490, 497, 198 P.3d
128, 135 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Brumfield, 136 Idaho 913, 917,42 P.3d 706,
710 (Ct. App. 2001) (citation omitted) ('''a series of acts that appear innocent,
when viewed separately, may warrant further investigation when viewed
together"'). Here, on a Friday night, Officer Stace observed Morgan drive around
a block and stop in a location with no homes along an irrigation ditch. There was,
as Officer Stace explained, no reason to drive around the block unless "they
were very lost or trying to avoid me." (Tr., p. 13, Ls. 1-3.) Although each of
Morgan's behaviors might be subject to innocent explanation when viewed in
isolation, considered together and in light of the officer's training and experience,
the officer's observations gave rise to reasonable suspicion sufficient to detain
the vehicle.
The totality of the circumstances at the time Officer Stace stopped Morgan
supported Officer Morgan's reasonable suspicion that Morgan may have been

15

involved in criminal activity.

Morgan has failed to show that the district court

abused its discretion in denying his motion to suppress.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Philip James
Morgan's conviction and sentence.

DATED this 18 th day of October, 2011.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 18th day of October, 2011, served a
true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a
copy addressed to:
JASON C. PINTLER
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.

f!£\~(}f~~

ELI~TH A. KOECKEITZ
Deputy Attorney General
EAKIpm
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APPENDIX A

2.
All accessible person parking spaces shall be near curb cuts and/or ramps for wheelchair
and other mechanical devise usage. All accessible parking spaces hereinafter created shall be free
of impediment and shall be located in areas where persons exiting the vehicle will exit onto
concrete, asphalt, brick or other level hard surface.
3.
For each designated parking space or area there shall be posted immediately adjacent to,
and visible from each stall or space, a sign, which is at least sixty (60) inches above the ground,
consisting of the international accessible symbol as shown in Idaho Code.
F.

Parking Violations:
1.
The Parking or standing of a vehicle in a space reserved for the disabled including the
area specifically designed and marked for loading and unloading, which space is signed in
conformance with Idaho Code, is prohibited, unless a vehicle is momentarily in the space for the
purpose of allowing a person with a disability to enter or leave the vehicle, or unless special
license plates or card or temporary card for the disabled is displayed on the vehicle. The
registered owner of a vehicle parked in violation of the provisions of this subsection is guilty of
an infraction.
2.
Any unauthorized use of the plate or card shall constitute an infraction. Law enforcement
officials shall enforce the provisions of this section and are empowered, using reasonable
discretion, to check personal identification to determine if the user of the plate or placard is the
disabled person so authorized to use such accessible persons parking privileges.

(6631, Amended, 1-15-2008; 6243, Amended, 07/15/2003; 6005, Amended, 0711812000; 5746, Amended, 08/20/1996; 5593, Amended,
12/0611994; 5263, Amended, 09/2511990; 5125, Added, 1011 111988)

Section 10-11-04 STOPPING, STANDING OR PARKING PROHIBITED IN SPECIFIED
PLACES
Except when necessary to avoid conflict with other traffic, or in compliance with law or the
directions of a police officer or official traffic control device, no person shall:
A.

Stop, stand or park a vehicle:
1.

On the roadway side of any vehicle stopped or parked at the edge or curb of a street;

2.

On a sidewalk or parkway as defined in Section 9-24-1 of the Boise City Code;

3.

Within an intersection;

4.

On a crosswalk;

5.

On a bike lane or bike path as defined in Section 10-14-1 of the Boise City Code;

6.
Within twenty feet (20') of a bike path approach as defined in Section 10-14-1 of the
Boise City Code;
7.
Between a safety zone and the adjacent curb or within thirty feet (30') of points on the
curb immediately opposite the ends of a safety zone, unless a different length is indicated by
signs or markings;
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8.
Alongside or opposite any street excavation or obstruction when stopping, standing or
parking would obstruct traffic;
9.

Upon any bridge or other elevated structure upon a highway or within a highway tunnel;

10.

On any railroad tracks;

11.
At any place where official traffic-control devices posted at the direction or under the
authority of the Ada County Highway District or the Parking Services Office prohibit or limit
such stopping, standing or parking. It shall be prohibited for any person to remain stopped,
standing or parked past the time limit prescribed on each traffic control device. In addition, at the
expiration of the posted time limit, it will be required that all vehicles be removed from the block
face of the area in which it was parked in a posted time limit for the remainder of that calendar
day.
12.
B.

Along any yellow painted curb.

Stand or park a vehicle, unless driver occupied, except momentarily to pick up or discharge a
passenger or passengers:
1.

In front of a public or private driveway;

2.

Within fifteen feet (15') of a fire hydrant;

3.
Within twenty feet (20') of a crosswalk or a bike/pedestrian curb ramp, as defined in
Section 10-14-1 of the Boise City Code, except at an intersection where a traffic control signal is
in operation, or in a parking meter zone;
4.
Within thirty feet (30') upon the approach to any flashing signal, stop sign, yield sign or
traffic control signal located at the side of a roadway;
5.
Within twenty feet (20') of the driveway entrance to any fire station and on the side of a
street opposite the entrance to any fire station within seventy-five feet (75') of said entrance when
properly sign-posted;
6.
At any place where official traffic-control devices posted at the direction or under the
authority of the Ada County Highway District prohibit such stopping.
C.

D.

Park a vehicle, whether occupied or not, except temporarily for the purpose of and while actually
engaged in loading or unloading merchandise or passengers:
1.

Within fifty feet (50') of the nearest rail of a railroad crossing;

2.

At any place where official traffic-control devices prohibit such parking.

Park a vehicle as defined by Section 10-1-1 in or upon a street during the nighttime, except that
this prohibition does not apply in a business or restricted parking district and the owners or
occupants of property adjacent to a street may so park a vehicle in compliance with and as
authorized by any other provision of the Boise City Code. The Council, upon finding and
declaring the necessity to prohibit the parking or standing of vehicles upon a street during the
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nighttime or at other times during the day, may upon motion or order direct the Ada County
Highway District to post or erect signs prohibiting or limiting the stopping, standing or parking of
any vehicle upon the streets of the City.
(6606, Amended, 09/2512007; 4990, Amended, 03/0311 987; 4959, Amended, 10/0711 986; 4875, Added, 11/25/1985)

Section 10-11-05 PARKING NOT TO OBSTRUCT TRAFFIC
No person shall stop, park or leave standing any vehicle, whether attended or unattended, upon a
street or highway in such a manner or under such conditions as to leave available less than twelve feet
(12') of such roadway for the free movement of vehicular traffic.

Section 10-11-06 PARKING IN ALLEYS
No person shall park a vehicle within an alley, except while actively engaged in the expeditious
loading and unloading of passengers, supplies and merchandise. In no case shall the stop for loading and
unloading exceed thirty (30) minutes.
(4990, Added, 03/03/1987)

Section 10-11-07 EXTENDED PARKING PROHIBITED
No person shall park a vehicle upon any street, alley or public property for a period of seventytwo (72) hours or longer.
(4986, Added, 0211 711987)

Section 10-11-08 EXTENDED PARKING PROHIBITED IN RESTRICTED PARKING
DISTRICT: (Repealed by Ord. 4986,2-17-87)

Section 10-11-09 REQUIREMENTS FOR LEAVING VEHICLE UNATTENDED
No person having control or charge of a vehicle shall allow such vehicle to stand on any street
unattended without stopping the motor of the vehicle and effectively setting the brakes thereon.

Section 10-11-10 DECLARATION OF NECESSITY AND PURPOSE
The Council of Boise City finds and declares that within certain residential areas of the City there
exists a heavy concentration of vehicles which remain parked throughout the day and that a substantial
portion of these vehicles are not owned or operated by residents of these areas; that the presence of these
vehicles causes vehicular congestion on residential streets, impedes the movement of traffic and unduly
restricts the entry of residents to their homes; that such vehicular congestion creates polluted air,
excessive noise, trash and refuse and causes the deterioration of residential areas. The Council therefor
declares the necessity and public policy of establishing a procedure for the creation of residential permit
parking zones in which parking by non-residents will be restricted and the availability of parking for
residents will be protected.

Section 10-11-11
A.

CREATION OF RESIDENTIAL PERMIT PARKING ZONES

Boise City Parking Services may determine which, if any, areas of the City should be designated
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